Ownership biases and FDI in
One of the favorite indicators government officials, such as Mayor Wang Mang of Suzhou, and researchers on China like to cite to showcase economic achievements is the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) one is able to attract. By this criterion, Jiangsu province has been a huge success story. In absolute terms, Jiangsu ranks as the second largest provincial recipient of FDI (after Guangdong province). In 2002, Jiangsu received $10.2 billion in FDI, which accounted for nearly one-fifth of total FDI inflows into China. In contrast, the FDI inflows into Zhejiang only amounted to $3.1 billion in the same year. The less than stellar FDI inflows into Zhejiang prompted several research organizations-including the World Bank-to give a low score to the cities in Zhejiang on international integration.
However, as the above quote from Mayor Wang suggests, Jiangsu has consistently been outperformed by Zhejiang on those dimensions that actually matter-per capita income and economic growth. While both are prosperous, Jiangsu and Zhejiang got where they are via fundamentally different processes. Zhejiang is rich largely through a catch-up process; Jiangsu is rich today but it has always been rich. In 1980, Jiangsu already had the second largest GDP in the country (after Sichuan) and it produced almost twice as much as Zhejiang did. In per capita income terms, Jiangsu had occupied exactly the same spot in 1980 as it did in 2003-number three in the country (not including Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin, which do not have an agricultural sector). In contrast, Zhejiang ranked seventh in the country in 1980 but it ranked first by 2003 (again not counting Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin). after Guangdong, Jiangsu, and Shandong, at 920 billion yuan ($110 billion). In per capita income terms, however, Zhejiang ranked higher than Jiangsu. Excluding the three provincial-level cities-Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai-which have higher per capita income in part because they do not have an agricultural sector, Zhejiang was the richest province in China with a per Elsewhere I document in great detail a host of performance differences between these two provinces-including the fact that Jiangsu was more indebted, had a much higher investment/GDP ratios, and a higher non-performing loan ratio. In this paper, I focus on one difference between Jiangsu and Zhejiang: FDI has played a far greater role in the economy of Jiangsu than in the economy of Zhejiang since the early 1990s. This difference in the role of FDI is all the more remarkable given how similar these two provinces are. Both are coastal; in fact they are located next to each other and each is within striking distance from Shanghai. (On a Chinese map, Jiangsu is north of Shanghai and Zhejiang is to the south.) In the 1980s, before the large-scale FDI liberalization in 1992, the two provinces had almost identical FDI/GDP and trade/GDP ratios. There is also little difference in the FDI policies between them. In the 1990s, both equally embraced FDI.
Another set of differences is that Zhejiang has a large and a far more vibrant domestic private sector than Jiangsu.
3 Among the top 100 largest private firms in China, half of them came from Zhejiang province, twice as many as the number from Jiangsu province. 4 Again, the two provinces are quite comparable in private-sector development from a historical perspective. In capita GDP of 19,730 yuan ($2,377) in 2003. Jiangsu, with a per capita GDP at 16,796 yuan ($2,024), ranked third after Guangdong.
3 By domestic private sector, I mean firms owned and controlled by private entrepreneurs who are citizens of the People's Republic of China. This definition would exclude foreigninvested enterprises, collective firms (such as TVEs), and listed state-owned enterprises. In the Chinese economic literature, the broad term, non-state sector, encompasses domestic private firms, TVEs, FIEs, and partially private SOEs. The concept of a non-state sector is imprecise and it often motivates researchers to consider Zhejiang and Jiangsu as a single analytical category. A key insight of this paper is that Zhejiang and Jiangsu are in fact quite different in that Zhejiang discriminated less against the domestic private sector whereas Jiangsu discriminated more-in favor of firms such as TVEs. 4 There are other differences between Zhejiang and Jiangsu aside from the number of the largest private firms. There is no "missing middle" phenomenon in Zhejiang as in Jiangsu, i.e., there are far more large private firms in the middle tier in Zhejiang than in Jiangsu. Private firms in Jiangsu are either very big or very small; also in terms of industry distribution the largest private firms in Jiangsu tend to congregate in capital-intensive and government-controlled sectors (such as steel). In Zhejiang some of the largest private firms are found in the most competitive industries, such as garments and shoes.
1952, private firms accounted for 57 percent of the sales value in the retail sector in Jiangsu and 60 percent in Zhejiang. 5 (Data on other economic activities for this period are unavailable.) At the beginning of the reforms, the size of the industrial non-state sector was quite similar in the two provinces. (More data on this will be presented later in the paper.) Historically speaking, these two provinces were among the most entrepreneurial and culturally developed in China. Both supplied many industrialists/entrepreneurs to Shanghai in the first half of the twentieth century and throughout Chinese history the two provinces produced some of the most prominent literary and political giants. 6 The most important reason why the domestic private sector developed faster in Zhejiang than in Jiangsu has to do with policy differences. For complex reasons dealt with elsewhere, Zhejiang imposed less onerous ownership biases against domestic private firms while Jiangsu imposed more. 7 Jiangsu actively favored, in the1980s and up till the late 1990s, collective firms such as township and village enterprises (TVEs), whereas Zhejiang created a relatively more neutral business environment for both TVEs and domestic private firms. The result is that more efficient firms, i.e., private firms, in Zhejiang won the race, whereas in Jiangsu the failure of inefficient firms-and the success of efficient firms-was delayed by policies.
The hypothesis advanced in this paper is that there is a connection between ownership biases against domestic private firms on the one hand and FDI patterns on the other. And the causal direction runs from private sector development to FDI patterns, not the other way around.
The argument is that ownership biases against domestic private firms can contribute to a greater dependency on FDI through several mechanisms. First, foreign firms can enjoy relative property rights security under a policy regime that treats domestic firms very poorly (even if foreign firms are not granted the same level of property rights protection as the one enjoyed in their home 5 Data are from (State Statistical Bureau 1990 ) . 6 Some of these industrialists were household names in China. Rong Yiren, who ran the largest textile operation in China in the 1930s and 1940s, came from Suzhou. An Wang, who later founded Wang Computer in Massachusetts, came from Kunshan, a county in the vicinity of Suzhou. In politics, maybe as a sign of things to come, Zhou Enlai, Communist China's premier between 1949 and 1976, was born in Jiangsu. His nemesis, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the Nationalist government on the mainland and then on Taiwan, was born near Ningbo in Zhejiang. 7 Ownership biases against domestic private firms are well documented in economic research. See (Park and Shen 2000) and (Brandt and Li 2002) . countries). In this scenario, a biased domestic firm has an incentive to move its assets and/or potential gains from its future growth to the foreign sector to access the relatively superior legal protection and regulatory treatment accorded to foreign firms. 8 FDI preferences thus should correlate positively with the extent of ownership biases against domestic private firms (all else being equal).
The second mechanism operates on the capabilities of private firms. 9 Whatever their incentive to form joint ventures with foreign firms, biased private firms, even though run by talented entrepreneurs, are constrained from investing in quality controls and from developing other business capabilities. Less capable firms are less likely to become contractual suppliers to foreign firms on the one hand; on the other hand, a foreign firm would think twice to sign up a legally-disadvantaged and ownership-insecure domestic firm as a long-term supplier. The solution is a foreign takeover of local production, which confers financing and relative property rights security. FDI would rise on this account. It is easiest to illustrate this argument in a laborintensive and technologically-simple industry where contract production, not FDI, is in fact a standard business practice in cross-border transactions.
10 8 This incentive is not limited to establishing FIEs. The lack of legal protection created the widespread phenomenon of so-called "red-hat" firms-private firms that were registered as collective or even state-owned firms in order to access the greater political protection accorded to these firms. But this was not a costless arrangement. Private entrepreneurs had to cede substantial equity shares to the government, sometimes leading to acrimonious conflicts about the true ownership of these firms.
9 I have examined these two mechanisms empirically in my previous work but not as directly as in this paper. I have shown that in the garment industry more credit-and legallyconstrained private firms cede more equity and operational controls to foreign firms when forming joint ventures as compared with the better-financed TVEs (Huang 2003) . In a recent paper, (Huang and Wen 2003) show that this equity-ceding effect is greater in Jiangsu than in
Zhejiang. The difficulty with the previous work is that we only look at firms that are already foreign-owned, rather than those facing a choice between staying domestic or becoming foreignowned. The private sector surveys provide a way to test the ownership bias hypothesis more directly.
10 In a widely-used textbook on FDI, Richard (Caves 1996) Another hypothesis is that FDI policies differed between the two provinces. Again, we have a wealth of evidence to show that FDI policies did not differ between them, as will be shown later in this paper. It is important to establish this fact both for substantive and methodological reasons. Substantively, controlling for the effect of FDI policies enables us to commonly-postulated firm-specific assets-such as patents and organizational know-how-by pointing to the requirements of quality controls in labor-intensive industries. See (Lecraw 1977) and (Aggarwal and Weekly 1982) . This hypothesis rests on a weak empirical foundation about labor-intensive cross-border transactions. In labor-intensive industries, quality controls and controls of firms do not necessarily overlap with the legal boundaries of firms. Foreign buyers routinely send and station their own quality inspectors at supplier sites. These inspectors often dictate the raw materials and equipment used in the production and organization of production processes. Suppliers comply not because they are bureaucratic subordinates of the foreign buyers but because they value long-term relationships with the foreign buyers. Scholarship based on field research documents this phenomenon thoroughly. See (Hsing 1993) . The other idea often offered is that internalization of production is needed to avoid dependence on an inefficient court system.
See (Wells Jr. 1993 ). This assumes a legalistic contracting approach for a world full of nothing but relational contracting. (Woodruff 1998 ) documents the substantial relational contracting phenomenon in Mexico while (Hsing 1993) does so for Taiwan. In my own field research on garment industry, among hundreds of production contracts I have seen, I have yet to see one that spells out legal consequences for poor quality and late deliveries.
identify other drivers of FDI patterns. Methodologically, if property rights security does not vary between the two provinces in the foreign sector, then all the variations in the relative property rights security of foreign firms come from the variations in the ownership biases against the domestic private firms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first section provides more factual details about FDI patterns in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The second section documents different levels of ownership biases in the two provinces. The third section connects these two factual accounts and offers a number of hypotheses about why ownership biases against domestic private firms can contribute to higher FDI preferences. The fourth section explains two unique private sector surveys and uses the data from these two surveys to demonstrate the connections between ownership biases and FDI preferences. The final section concludes the paper.
A tale of two provinces: The FDI story
The following paragraphs show that in Jiangsu FDI was a more important source of financing, was distributed more widely in manufacturing industries and generated more export production than FDI did in Zhejiang.
FDI dependency
In the 1990s, there were some substantial differences in the FDI patterns between the two provinces. For one thing, Jiangsu depended far more heavily on FDI financing than Zhejiang, despite the fact that their initial FDI dependency was quite similar. On average, in the second half of the 1980s, both provinces drew very little FDI, as measured by the proportion of FDI to the total fixed asset investments. In Jiangsu, the ratio was only 0.63 percent, about the same as the ratio in Zhejiang (0.65 percent). In the first half of the 1990s, as China became more open to FDI, this ratio rose in both provinces, but much faster in Jiangsu. On average, FDI accounted for 13.6 percent of fixed asset investments in Jiangsu, which was more than twice the level in Zhejiang during the same period (5.7 percent). These contrasts are shown in Table 1 . Another measure of FDI dependency is a comparison of FDI with other forms of foreign capital inflows. FDI is a form of equity capital, which enables a foreign firm to establish an ownership claim on assets located in China, but theoretically speaking, a domestic firm can also borrow abroad to fund its production. Foreign debt capital provides the money but not foreign management controls. Here, Jiangsu and Zhejiang exhibit another set of differences. Jiangsu is more reliant on equity foreign capital and Zhejiang is more reliant on debt foreign capital. Table 2 . One way to describe the contrast in the role of foreign firms in export production between Jiangsu and Zhejiang is simply to document that foreign firms, for whatever reasons, have played a more important role in Jiangsu's export production than in Zhejiang's. A more interesting way to approach the above contrast is to ask why intra-firm export production prevails in Jiangsu, but why inter-firm export production prevails in Zhejiang. FDI-funded export production is essentially of an intra-firm kind whereby export transactions take place within the affiliates of foreign firms. Inter-firm exports take place between a Chinese firm and a foreign firm at the border and are contractual in nature. Thus an analytical question asks why contract export production appears to dominate in Zhejiang and why ownership production appears to dominate in Jiangsu.
One explanation can be that the export composition differs between Jiangsu and
Zhejiang. All else being equal, one might expect technologically sophisticated exports to be conducted within the affiliates of foreign firms. Foreign firms may possess special or specialized production and technological know-how. At least as of the mid-1990s, this was not a dominant explanation. In the mid-1990s, both provinces had a similar export composition. In both, the leading export items were cotton fabrics, silk, wool yarn, shoes, garments, toys, etc., according to (Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations 1996) .
To illustrate the contrast in contract vis-à-vis ownership production between the two provinces, let us look at labor-intensive exports only. Sophisticated technology and organizational know-how are not important inputs in the production of labor-intensive exports. While there is a widespread view that quality control requires foreign control of production, actual business practices suggest otherwise. 11 Nor does the view that foreign ownership is a substitute for 11 The reason is that foreign buyers can impose direct quality controls and supervision via a contractual mechanism. In fact, foreign buying firms and domestic contractors coordinate closely in a range of operating areas, including quality controls, selection of suppliers, the use of equipment, designs and specifications, etc. Field research has uncovered such practices widely among developing countries, as did my own field research in Zhejiang and Guangdong in China.
In Taiwan, shoe manufacturers need to obtain inspectors' signature before sending the product to the foreign buyer. The foreign buying firms routinely stationed quality inspectors in the factories, some staying there permanently. The following paragraph describes the practice in the shoe industry in Mexico (Woodruff 1998 ):
Most important, both manufacturers and retailers recognized the right of retailers to inspect delivered merchandize for adherence to the order and for defective workmanship.
Without this right, a manufacturer's incentives to produce products of quality workmanship would have been significantly reduced.
Not only is internalization unnecessary for quality supervision, it may not be even sufficient. This is a surprising and an extremely interesting observation, and it is from a detailed study of Taiwan's footwear industry. In this study, You-tien Hsing shows that trading firms in fact avoided taking an equity position in the manufacturing facilities in order to enhance quality controls. One of the manufacturers in his study became less cooperative regarding suggestions for quality improvement after a trading firm acquired a stake in it. Internalization can be in fact detrimental to quality controls. Hsing (1993) remarks:
This is because quality inspection requires a certain distance and independence between those who inspect and those who are being inspected, and a trading firm's financial involvement in partner manufacturing firms will inevitably diminish the former's objectivity in performing quality inspections. industries with the largest fixed asset investments are, respectively, papermaking and paper products (18.5%), smelting and pressing of ferrous metals (9.7%), and textiles (8.9%). These three industries combined accounted for 37.1% of fixed asset investments by FIEs in 1997. In
Jiangsu province, the top three industries with the largest fixed asset investments are, respectively, transportation equipment (11%), papermaking and paper products (9.6%), and special purpose equipment (9.3%). These three industries combined accounted for 29.9 percent of all fixed asset investments made by FIEs in 1997. In addition, both the standard deviation and coefficient of variation values for the industry distribution of fixed asset investments by FIEs in 1997 are larger for Zhejiang than for Jiangsu.
Two issues can be raised about the fixed asset investment measure. One is that the data refer to one year only, 1997, and the data may simply reflect patterns for that particular year. To correct this potential bias, we use a stock measure-distribution of foreign equity across the same 29 manufacturing industries-and the results are identical. The top three industries in Zhejiang accounted for 33.9% of all foreign equity and they accounted for 29.2% in Jiangsu. Also Zhejiang has higher standard deviation and coefficient of variation values than Jiangsu.
The second potential bias is that the above results may reflect different compositions of FDI inflows into these two provinces. For example, if Jiangsu received more FDI from the three ethnically Chinese economies-Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao-than Zhejiang, one may find a wider distribution of FDI in Jiangsu than in Zhejiang. It is possible that ethnically Chinese foreign firms may be more familiar with local cultures and customs than non-ethnically Chinese foreign firms and thus they may be more active in more industries.
Leaving aside its theoretical imprecision, 12 there is no empirical support for this notion.
In 1997, the top three industries with the largest fixed asset investments by ethnically Chinese 
A tale of two provinces: Ownership biases
Western academics have tended to consider Jiangsu and Zhejiang together as examples of the most successful development of the non-state sector in China. The assumption is that the ownership biases in these two provinces have been more modest compared with the rest of China.
This paper questions this assumption and shows that there are substantial differences in the degree of ownership biases between these two provinces. Specifically, the ownership biases against the domestic private sector-and in favor of the state-sponsored collective sector-are far more substantial in Jiangsu than in Zhejiang. At least as of the early 1990s, the ownership biases in Jiangsu against domestic private sector were not substantially different from the rest of the country.
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In this section, I will first offer documentary evidence on the differences in the ownership biases between the two provinces. This is followed by more systematic quantitative measures of these differences.
Documentary evidence
In 1980 15 This paper takes the difference between these two models as given rather than exploring their origins. (Jin and Qian 1998) The Sunan and Wenzhou models differ on several dimensions. First, government control of firms was far tighter in Jiangsu. In 1985, the Wuxi government adopted the following measures: (1) penalties for skilled workers who left collective TVEs for other jobs, including barring their family members from jobs in TVEs; (2) thorough status checks on the enterprise registration documents and procedures; and (3) limits on managers' pay at three times of the average payroll (Luo 1990, p. 150) . Wenzhou favored a far more laissez-faire policy stance and did not exercise this kind of micro-management.
Second, until the mid-1990s, Jiangsu actively suppressed the development of private firms. The first two policy measures were designed explicitly to constrain private firms. The tight labor regulations reduced the availability of quality human capital to the private sector and the strict registration procedures prevented private entrepreneurs from falsely registering their firms as collective firms, a popular mechanism to evade the prohibitions on private firms and to acquire some rudimentary property rights security associated with a closer relationship with the state.
Jiangsu wanted to conserve raw materials and energy and to protect TVEs as much as possible from competition for human and financial resources. Private enterprises "are tolerated, but their development has been constrained by limits on loans, restricted access to inputs, and environmental and other regulations" (Svejnar and Woo 1990, p. 80) . As a result of this bias, the dominance of the more government-controlled TVEs was overwhelming in Wuxi. In 1985, collective TVEs constituted 36 percent of the total number of industrial non-state firms and contributed 96 percent of the gross value of industrial output. The private sector in the industrial arena was simply inconsequential (Svejnar and Woo 1990, pp. 67-69 (Oi 1999) and (Park and Shen 2000) .
17 (Jin and Qian 1998) three years later the number had increased elevenfold to 20,363.
By the early 1990s, Wenzhou had become well-known as a hub of private entrepreneurial activities. (Byrd and Lin 1990, p. 34) , in the same World Bank study that includes Wuxi, characterize the Wenzhou model as follows:
The famous 'Wenzhou' model is characterized by free development of private enterprises (mostly household undertakings), a thriving financial market based to a large extent on private financial institutions, and extensive commercial relationships with distant parts of China.
The centerpiece of the Wenzhou model was an active informal credit market servicing private enterprises, much of which was not sanctioned by the central government. Despite the dynamism of the private sector, "the state banking system was neither willing or jurisdictionally able to meet the credit needs of the new generation of individual entrepreneurs" (Tsai 2002, pp. 122-3) . In the 1980s, the informal financing mechanisms thrived and they included rotating credit associations (hui), money houses, and credit cooperatives. The Wenzhou government, rather than curtailing the informal credit facilities, tried to incorporate them into the formal financial sector.
Its reasoning is particularly illuminating of the economic liberalism of Wenzhou-informal finance should be made official to enhance regulatory supervision and to better meet the rising credit demand from the private sector (Tsai 2002, pp. 157-158) .
There are, however, differences in the formal financial sector as well. Banks in Zhejiang lent more to the private sector than banks in Jiangsu, although in both provinces the bulk of lending has always gone to the state sector. In Jiangsu province, the private sector received a smaller share of credit resources compared with that in Zhejiang. In the 1990-1995 period, on average, the loans directly allocated to the private sector amounted to 4.3 percent of total loans in Jiangsu; the same figure for Zhejiang was 8 percent. 18 What is impressive about Zhejiang is that the direct credit allocation to the private sector was already substantial in the 1980s. On average between 1985 and 1989, 6 .9 percent of the loans went to the private sector, as compared with 1.7 percent in Jiangsu.
Quantitative evidence
Our quantitative evidence comes from an FDI survey conducted in 1999. 19 This survey asked the same local officials in the two cities in Jiangsu and Zhejiang to rank the economic 18 Loans allocated to the private sector are defined as the sum of the loans that go to individually-owned businesses and a category called "other loans." Other loans, according to (Lardy 1998) , represent credit from banks to non-bank financial institutions. Non-bank financial institutions typically lend to private or non-state entities. The category of individually-owned businesses does not include the other type of private businesses, which are known as privatelyrun businesses, defined as those with hired labor of eight or more employees. Also the figure does not include the loans that are directly allocated to SOEs, which then on-lend to the private firms.
Data on this type of loans is simply unavailable. It is possible that the exclusion of this type of lending activities may produce a bias in our estimate. Because the political legitimacy of private businesses is higher in Zhejiang, it is likely that more of the credit allocation to the private sector is over the table, while more of the credit allocation in Jiangsu is under-the-table. But because of our underlying interest in analyzing the differences in political preferences between these two provinces, rather than arriving at an exact figure of loan allocation to the private sector, the direct credit allocation is in fact a better measure. The source of the data is (State Statistical Bureau 1996) . 19 The survey was commissioned for the book project, Selling China. I designed the survey and the Research Center for Contemporary China at Peking University implemented it.
For each city, 200 officials were selected. The sample included 1,444 local government officials in eight cities. Most of the officials (85.9 percent) represented in the survey are middle-level officials, i.e., at the division level of the city governments. The survey was implemented between contributions of SOEs, collective firms, and domestic private firms on the same 0-10 scale they used to rank FIEs. The score 0 represents no contributions and the score 10 represents the most contributions. Table 4 reports the percentage share of responses at or above 8 in each category of firms-SOEs, collective firms, and private firms. Table 4 about here.
The most striking finding is that in both provinces SOEs were ranked the highest, i.e.,
with the largest share of responses between 8 and 10, as compared with the two other categories of firms. In both provinces, private firms were ranked the lowest. This result is all the more remarkable considering the economic reality on the ground. In each province, measured in terms of gross industrial output value, SOEs made the smallest contributions. In Jiangsu, SOEs accounted for 20 percent of the gross industrial value of output (GIVO) but 81 percent of the surveyed officials in Jiangsu believed that SOEs' contributions to the economy were high. In
Zhejiang, SOEs made up only 10 percent of the GIVO, but 60.2 percent of the surveyed officials in Zhejiang ranked SOEs' economic contributions very highly.
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Equally interesting as this divergence between the political and economic rankings of firms in the Chinese economy is the divergence of views between officials in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. A far higher proportion of officials in Jiangsu ranked SOEs very highly-defined here as giving SOEs a score of 8 on a 0-10 scale-than officials in Zhejiang. In contrast, more officials in Zhejiang ranked private firms highly than they did in Jiangsu, 44.2 percent vis-à-vis 27 percent. Thus, although ownership biases existed in both provinces, the extent of the biases were milder in Zhejiang than they were in Jiangsu.
Ownership biases and FDI: Some hypotheses
How can we explain the observed contrast in FDI patterns between Jiangsu and Zhejiang? And are there connections between the differences in the roles of FDI in the two economies and their levels of ownership biases? In this section, I offer a number of hypotheses to suggest that the ownership biases against domestic private firms could increase the FDI preferences of the biased firms. The central idea is that Chinese private entrepreneurs, just as January and July 1999. The response rate was 90 percent. To ensure honesty, accuracy, and a high response rate, researchers from the Research Center for Contemporary China closely supervised the entire survey process. 20 In my previous work, I call this phenomenon the political pecking order of firms (Huang 2003b ).
entrepreneurs elsewhere, valued deeply the security of their property rights. In a system where property rights are insecure, FDI became a mechanism to attain that security. But first let me rule out a number of alternative hypotheses that might have also been compatible with the phenomenon documented here.
Alternative hypotheses
To simplify the analytical task at hand, we can rule out a number of "easy" explanations for why FDI seemed to have played a greater role in Jiangsu's economy than it did in Zhejiang.
We already ruled out one: the larger role of FDI in Jiangsu is not because Jiangsu had better- Table 2 .
We also have survey evidence on the FDI policy stances of these two provinces (drawing from the same FDI survey cited before). Table 2 
Foreign ownership as property rights security
In a recent paper, (Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik 2004) put forward the argument that initial triggers of growth can often be "humble" in nature. They amount to nothing more than some relaxation of specific constraints on the private sector. No fundamental institutional reforms-those aiming at property rights protection, for example-are needed. One of the examples cited in this paper is China's growth spurt after Deng Xiaoping introduced modest reforms in 1978.
This interpretation of Deng Xiaoping's reforms is accurate as far as the specific components of his reforms are concerned. But it should be stressed that the ascendancy of Deng
Xiaoping in 1978 represented a substantial ideological shift and this ideological shift did entail important implications for security of property rights going beyond the specifics of his reforms.
During the Cultural Revolution, the private sector was systematically and brutally eliminated. In one episode, around the 1983-1984 period, the Wenzhou municipal government invited the largest private entrepreneurs in the city to attend a conference. The purpose of the conference was to exchange information and to publicize their success. According to interviews, many entrepreneurs refused to come, fearing that it was a trap the government had set up to arrest them en masse right at the conference site. Of those who showed up, quite a few brought with them their toothbrushes, having mentally prepared to face jail. The conference went as advertised.
In the other episode, in 1984, the Wenzhou government released a number of entrepreneurs whom it had arrested in 1982. Not only that, the Wenzhou government published the decisions in local newspapers explaining why it was wrong to have arrested these entrepreneurs in 1982. It was unprecedented-and it is still unprecedented today-for a branch of the Chinese government to openly and so publicly acknowledge its mistakes. 22 Twenty years later, many entrepreneurs cited these two episodes as having convinced them of their personal security.
22 These entrepreneurs were among what was known in the early 1980s as the "eight big kings" (badawang) in Wenzhou. These were extremely successful entrepreneurs with personal wealth in excess of 100,000 yuan, a huge amount in the early 1980s. Some of these entrepreneurs had created very successful and competitive businesses producing electric transformers. In the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government created a dualist legal regime under which FIEs-firms funded by FDI-and domestic firms are subjected to entirely different bodies of legislation and laws. In general, the legal regime created for FIEs is far more codified and detailed than the one for domestic private firms. There is also ample evidence that the legal and regulatory treatment of FIEs is superior to that of domestic private firms. In 2002, a vice chairman of the National People's Congress-China's legislature-wrote that of eighty or so economic sectors, domestic private firms were permitted entry into forty of them whereas foreign firms were allowed to enter sixty of them.
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Thus the characterization that China did not enact institutional reforms in the 1980s and 1990s is only partially correct. China did not do so for the domestic private sector but the institutional reforms were quite substantial in the foreign sector. Herein lies the linkage between the ownership biases against domestic private firms and FDI. The most straightforward hypothesis is that a biased domestic private firm has ample incentives to move its assets (and/or its future growth opportunities) to the foreign sector in order to access the superior legal treatment granted to foreign firms. The stronger the ownership biases are, the stronger such preferences for alliances with foreign firms.
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Some of them were summarily arrested; others were heavily fined; and still others fled Wenzhou altogether. This is the background of the 1984 decision to release the entrepreneurs. 23 These issues are treated at great length elsewhere. See (Huang 2003) . 24 This idea does not require showing that the Constitutional commitment to foreign property rights was rigidly followed. (It was not in many cases.) All it requires is that the variations in the commitment to foreign property rights are less compared with the variations in Our hypothesis is entirely consistent with the FDI patterns we observe in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. The FDI/capital formation ratio is high in Jiangsu because domestic private firms are not able to get financing and legal protection and thus do not invest as much as domestic private firms in Zhejiang. This dynamic would suggest that the value of the denominator in the FDI/capital formation ratio would increase more slowly for Jiangsu than for Zhejiang, given the same business opportunities, which would lead to a higher FDI dependency ratio as a result.
Our hypothesis would also be consistent with the fact that FDI is present in more industries in Jiangsu than in Zhejiang and that foreign firms are more dominant in export-oriented labor-intensive industries in Jiangsu than in Zhejiang. For a legally and credit-constrained private firm in Jiangsu, the single greatest advantage of a foreign firm is that it is foreign. Thus domestic private firms value alliances with foreign firms for legal, as opposed to business, reasons. Since legal advantages are not industry-specific, foreign firms then command across-the-board advantages vis-à-vis domestic private firms in Jiangsu, not just in those industries where foreign firms enjoy firm-specific advantages-those advantages FDI economists often postulate as drivers of FDI. In Zhejiang, foreign firms hold only firm-specific advantages and thus they gravitate toward those industries where they are strong. Contract production is also difficult in Jiangsu because a foreign buyer would be reluctant to contract with a domestic firm whose legal status is not secure. In Zhejiang, contract production is more feasible because domestic private firms have a higher level of property rights security. Thus the feasibility of contract production does not depend on the legal treatment of foreign firms but on the legal treatment of those domestic firms that are potential contractees. (This logic explains why contract production was feasible in Taiwan and Korea in the 1960s and 1970s even though rule of law was inadequate.
The reason is that the domestic private firms themselves were legally secure.)
Ownership biases and FDI preferences: An empirical test
The 1993 joint ventures with foreign firms. Responses to these questions will be the basis for the dependent variable in this paper.
All the surveyed firms were selected from the registration lists maintained by the local bureaus of industry and commerce. 26 This means that these firms already operated in the formal sector at the time of the survey. The potential bias here is that those private firms most severely discriminated against-and therefore having chosen to go underground-are not included in the survey. This bias is not too debilitating for this paper for three reasons. The first reason is that we are not trying to provide an accurate estimate of the output value of the private sector, in which case such an omission would be a problem. Another reason is that, at least by 2002, it is possible that the treatment of private firms had improved sufficiently that firms no longer chose to go underground for the reason of ownership bias (although they might still have done so to evade taxes). A related reason is that the two provinces chosen for analysis in this paper have a relatively modest ownership bias compared with the rest of the country-although the degree of ownership bias differs between them-and therefore this source of bias is probably small in these two provinces.
The third reason is that this paper is about acquiring foreign ownership as a way to overcome ownership bias rather than about why a private firm chose this particular method to overcome ownership bias but not other methods. Two other potential mechanisms are available to a severely biased private firm. One is to go underground; the other is to register itself as a SOE or collective firm. (This is called a "red-hat" firm.) All of our firms have chosen not to go underground and some of our firms have chosen not to register themselves as SOEs or collective firms. Why they did not choose these two methods is a fascinating question but it is not a concern of this particular paper.
Within each province, the 2002 survey focused on six types of regions for focus, three on political criteria and three on economic criteria. The political criteria were: 1) the provincial capital, 2) a prefecture-level city, and 2) a county-level city. On economic criteria, the survey sampled firms located in the advanced, medium advanced, and least advanced areas. By these political and economic criteria, the 2002 survey covered eleven regions in Jiangsu province and six cities in Zhejiang. The difference in the number of cities covered in these two provinces 26 I will mainly focus on the 2002 survey to explain the survey methodology. There is more information available about the 2002 survey but it is reasonable to make the conjecture that the 1993 survey was based on the same methodology.
apparently stems from the fact that a larger number of cities fall under the administrative jurisdiction of prefecture-level cities in Jiangsu.
Within each region, the firms were randomly selected. The total number of surveyed firms in each region amounted to around 0.16 percent of the total number of registered private firms in that region in the 2002 survey and about 1 percent in the 1993 survey. By default, the survey would have sampled regions with a larger number of private firms more heavily. We will use regional dummy variables to control for this sampling bias.
Variable construction
The definitions and summary statistics of the major variables are listed in Table 5 In the empirical implementation, in order to capture more precisely the idea of FDI preferences, we also exclude those firms that have already formed joint ventures with foreign firms in some of the regression runs and the dependent variable is a choice between planning to form a joint venture and not planning to form a joint venture. This is designed to eliminate any potential for an endogeneity problem-that the ownership bias refers to the bias against private firms with foreign-owned assets. Ex ante, however, as will be explained later, this should not be a problem. 28 This will be the primary ownership bias measure for this paper because it is the most straightforward and it has the largest coverage of firms. respondents whether or not they hold patents and we created a technology variable coded as 1 for firms with patents and 0 for firms without patents. In the 1993 survey, no information on patents is available but there is a question about whether or not a firm does R&D. So we created a R&D dummy for the 1993 survey. We also include alternate measures of firm size in all the regressions. One measure is the employment size; the other measure is the sales value of the firms.
We also add a number of other controls. One set of controls refers to three locational variables. One is a dummy variable for development zones. Many regions in China have created development zones with the specific purpose of attracting FDI. The second is a countryside dummy variable whether or not a firm is located in the countryside. The third is a regional dummy variable to differentiate regions within as well as between the two provinces.
In all the regression runs, we include a dummy for manufacturing industries or all the industry dummies. Both surveys break down firms by fifteen industries-1) agriculture and fishery, 2) mining, 3) manufacturing, 4) electricity and gas, 5) construction, 6) geology, 7) transport, 8) commerce, 9) finance, 10) real estate, 11) social services, 12) health and sports, 13) science and technology, and 15) others. The classification has the unfortunate effect of being too broad in some cases and too narrow in others. Majority of the firms are in the manufacturing sector. For example for the 2002 survey, they account for 397 out of 733 observations for the two-province subsample and some sectors have no firms at all (such as finance). However, there is no further disaggregation of manufacturing firms, which makes it difficult to control for a number of potentially relevant industry characteristics. Fortunately, due to the entry restrictions imposed on private firms in the 1990s, it is safe to assume that most private firms might have operated in relatively labor-intensive industries. Therefore, after the variables measuring patent holdings and firm size, the hope is that industry characteristics among the manufacturing private firms are not substantially different. Our default strategy is to include a manufacturing industry dummy, although we also experimented with regressions that include all fifteen industry dummies (minus the benchmarked one).
In addition, in some of the regressions based on the 2002 survey data we also add a number of additional firm-level controls and for the 1993 survey, we also control for whether or 
Findings
Several interesting patterns emerge from an inspection of the data in Table 5 Table 6 and Table 7 present regression findings from the 2002 survey and Table 8 presents findings from the 1993 survey. Table 6 (Zhejiang is the omitted province.) Specifications 1, 2, 3 and 5 include one dummy for the manufacturing industry, whereas specification 4 includes 14 industry dummies (out of a total of 15 industries). All the regressions include a period dummy denoting those firms created since 1991, a size variable (log employment), a technological variable (a dummy for those firms holding patents), and two locational variables (whether located in a development zone or in the countryside with the omitted category being the city variable). The variable of interest is the ownership bias measure, i.e., bank bias (BANK_BIAS), which is a dummy variable denoting those firms that viewed credit difficulties as grounded in ownership bias. In all five specifications, BANK_BIAS is consistently positive and consistently statistically significant. In the two-province subsample, the coefficient of BANK_BIAS ranges from 0.36 to 0.44, with the statistical significance levels between 1 and 5 percent. This means, all else being equal, that those domestic private firms that viewed bank discrimination as rooted in ownership considerations were more likely to form JVs with foreign firms than those firms that viewed bank discrimination as rooted in technical considerations (such as high collateral requirements). This finding is true for both the two-province subsample as well as for the national sample as a whole (specification 3) and it is robust to a variety of province, city, and industry controls.
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Before we conclude that ownership bias seems to positively correlate with FDI preferences, let us consider a number of complications. One is the possibility that BANK_BIAS is endogenous of foreign ownership rather than the other way around, as postulated in this paper.
Economists and social scientists in general often assume that governments discriminate against foreign firms and protect domestic firms. This is known as the "national preference" view of the The second concern is that there may be an interaction effect between BANK_BIAS and the firm-level attributes. For example, it is reasonable to conjecture that only firms that enjoy ownership security can grow to be large and can have the resources to invest in R&D. Thus the reported BANK_BIAS results may simply reflect this effect. To investigate this possibility, specifications 1, 2, and 3 in Table 7 experimented with alternative measures of firm controls or omitted the firm-level attributes altogether.
Under specification 1, the size of firms is measured by the sales value, rather than the size of employment. Under specification 2, the technological sophistication of a firm is measured by the ratio of technicians to total employment. Specification 3 omitted all the firm-level controls.
BANK_BIAS remains positive and statistically significant throughout. Specifications 5 and 6
provide additional checks on our findings. The dependent variable is now a binary measure, with those firms planning to form, in the process of forming, or having already formed JVs being coded 1 or 0 otherwise (FDIPREF2). Specification 6 omitted those firms that have already formed JVs in order to denote more sharply the idea of "preference." BANK_BIAS is positive and is statistically significant at 1 percent in both specifications. 31 In FDI research, there is a long and venerable view that host governments discriminate against foreign firms in order to protect domestic firms. The phrase, "national preference,"
belongs to (Caves 1996) . Fortunately, the 1993 survey did ask respondents whether they exported. Table 8 presents results drawing on the 1993 survey. The specifications are similar to those in the previous tables but all include a dummy term denoting whether or not the firm exported. This export dummy has no effect on our ownership bias measures in the regressions. In fact, none of the export dummy variables in the six specifications is statistically significant. Table   8 . 
Conclusion
In this paper, we show that ownership biases against domestic private firms can lead to higher FDI preferences. Although not demonstrated directly in this paper, it is plausible to argue that higher FDI preferences can translate into a greater economic role of FDI. For example, a biased domestic private firm can agree to give up more control when forming JVs with foreign firms, thus enticing more FDI inflows. This postulation would be consistent with the empirical patterns of FDI in Jiangsu and Zhejiang.
It is possible to have both a positive and a negative spin on our findings. On the positive side, FDI can be viewed as a mechanism to provide relative property rights security and is a sanctuary for entrepreneurship in a poor system. On the negative side, one can argue that FDI inflows reflect extant inefficiencies in the system and foreign firms have capitalized on more business opportunities than they would otherwise have given these inefficiencies. Leaving aside how one judges the role of FDI, the analytical implication is that property rights security matters to Chinese entrepreneurs. .Source:. (Office of Third Industrial Census 1997). The data are based on enterprises with independent accounting system. These firms account for 85 percent of the industrial output value. Note: Standard errors are in the brackets. *: 0.10, **: 0.5 and ***: 0.01. Note: Standard errors are in the brackets. *: 0.10, **: 0.5 and ***: 0.01. 
